Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies
Volume 24

Article 6

1-1-2006

The Wall of Separation Between Church and State: The Role of
Christian Natural Law in American Jurisprudence Past and
Present
Brent Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma

Recommended Citation
Taylor, Brent (2006) "The Wall of Separation Between Church and State: The Role of Christian Natural Law
in American Jurisprudence Past and Present," Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies: Vol.
24 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol24/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU
ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Taylor - Separation

THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CtWRCH AND STATE:
THE ROLE OF CHRISTIAN NATlIRAL LAW IN AMERICAN JllRISPRllDENCE PAST AND
PRESENT

BRENT TAYLOR

In 2002 the California based Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools was unconstitutional. The Court declared,
"The Pledge, as currently codified, is an impermissible government endorsement of
religion" (Newdow 2002, 20). The dramatic ruling, the ensuing debate, and the eventual
reversal by the US Supreme Court brought one of America's most divisive issues again to
the political forefront: the separation of church and state. The court room is the primary
battleground for this divisive debate, as opponents and proponents file suits and
countersuits. The current judicial paradigm for this controversial topic is the 1947
Everson v. Board ot" Education case, where the Supreme Court declared, "The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state" (Everson 1947, 18). The 'wall
of separation' paradigm has-since its popularization in 1947-become the dominant
jurisprudential approach to church and state questions in the United States. This paper
uses judicial evidence to argue that although the 'wall of separation' metaphor is the
current judicial interpretation, this interpretation is a fairly recent creation-one which
the Founding Fathers did not author and would not recognize.
The author acknowledges the burden of proof required to substantiate such a
dramatic claim, because as Carl Sagan famously remarked, "extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence." As such, this paper uses direct citations from multiple preEverson US and state Supreme Court cases to demonstrate that the American Founders
created no clear 'wall of separation,' but rather that the Founders built a government and
courts based on a legal system that this paper terms "Christian natural law." Sir William
Blackstone-arguably the thinker who most influenced the American Founders-was
also the major proponent of the Christian natural law system. The influence of
Blackstone and Christian natural law is clearly evident in pre-Everson American
jurisprudence, but the Court's ruling in Everson has dramatically changed the course of
American church and state law by erecting a 'wall of separation' unintended by the
Founders.
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NATURAL LAW

Thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Aquinas and Locke have elucidated different
principles of what is loosely cal1ed the natural law position. While their views of natural
law vary greatly, they all agree on what is generally considered a fundamental principle
of natural law: "the claim that there is a necessary connection between law and morality"
(White & Patterson 1999,4). Proponents of natural law also generally hold that these
moral principles "are universal" (White & Patterson 1999, 4).
Early philosophers who proposed natural law arguments generally credited "reason"
with the disclosure or discovery of natural law principles, rather than "a Supreme Being or
metaphysical force. For example, Cicero asserted, "True law is right reason in agreement
with nature" (Bix 1985, 224). Classical Christian thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas, and
Gratian, however, developed natural law theories that were deeply rooted in Christian
theology. In Decretum, Gratian's intluential medieval work of jurisprudence, he asserts,
"Natural law (ius) is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel by which each is
commanded to do to another what he want done to himself and forbidden to do to another
what he does not want done to himself' (Tierney 1997, 59). The scriptures from the Old
and New Testaments (the Law and the Gospel, respectively) form the basis for Gratian's
natural law theory; in short, he bases his jurisprudence on the Biblical "Golden Rule" of
doing good to one another.
Like Gratian, Aquinas also based his philosophy of natural law on Christian
principles. Aquinas created a hierarchy of laws which are, listed in descending order of
perfection and importance: eternal law, natural law, divine law, and human law. Eternal
law is fully known only to God, but every other form of law, "is a kind of retlection and
participation of the eternal law" (Steinberger 2000, 520). Aquinas blends Christianity
and classical, rational thought by asserting that divine law is revealed by God to man, yet
natural law is discovered by reason. Aquinas explains that the, "participation of the
eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law" (Steinberger 2000, 512). In
summary, natural laws are based upon God's eternal laws, but they are discovered by
human reason, and humans are expected in turn to use reason to create human laws based
upon the natural laws.
The intluence of this fusion of Classical and Christian thought upon Western culture
can hardly be overestimated. This blending of reason and revealed Christianity
introduced by the medieval canonists and later perfected by Locke and Blackstone would
form the basis of English (and by extension, American) common law and jurisprudence.
Sir William Blackstone, an Eighteenth Century English jurist, built upon the
foundation of previous natural law thinkers and advanced a system that this paper terms
"Christian natural law." Belief in a "Supreme Being," who, "formed the universe," and
"established certain laws" (White & Patterson 1999,27) is the foundation of Blackstone's
Christian natural law. Based upon this strong belief in a Supreme Being, Blackstone held
that nothing in the universe or nature is "left to chance," but that instead everything is
"preformed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down
by the great Creator" (White & Patterson 1999, 28).
Blackstone built his legal theory upon this belief in a Supreme Creator by stating,
"[the] will of [the] maker is called the law of nature," and by identifYing these natural
laws as "the eternal immutable laws of good and evil (White & Patterson 1999,28)." The
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meaning and purpose of these natural laws are not readily apparent, however, and hence
God "gave [man] also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of these laws" (White
& Patterson 1999). Thus, man is able to discover the natural laws by reason, which is a
gift from the Creator.
In addition to natural law, Blackstone gives great importance to divine law, which is
not discovered by reason, but rather by "immediate and direct revelation" (White &
Patterson 1999, 30). This divine law is "to be found only in the holy scriptures" (White
& Patterson \ 999, 30) and is given by God to guide men spiritually on earth.
Blackstone explains, "Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of
revelation, depend all human laws" (White & Patterson 1999, 30). Thus, both direct
revelation and human reason have a place in his Christian natural law theory. Humans
are to use revealed divine law along with the reasoned understanding of natural law to
create just human laws. These laws should be based upon the following general
principles: "That [man] should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to
everyone his due" (White & Patterson 1999,28-29). Importantly, Blackstone states that
human laws should never "be suffered to contradict" either divine or natural law, because
human laws "are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the fonner" (White &
Patterson J 999, 30).
In Blackstone's system, law is supreme.
Law is not merely "counsel" or
"persuasion," but it is a, "matter of injunction ... a command directed to us" (White &
Patterson 1999, 32). The rule of law is to be respected and obeyed, particularly since
human law derives from divine law. A far-sighted Blackstone also suggested the manner
by which laws should be interpreted, "The fairest and rational method to interpret the will
of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by
signs the most natural and probable" (White & Patterson 1999, 34-35). Although
Blackstone's theory allows for legal interpretation, he warns against giving judges too
much judicial discretion, "which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce the
most infinite confusion" (White & Patterson 1999, 36). Not only would giving judges
too much interpretive power create confusion, it might also "destroy all law, and leave
the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge" (White & Patterson
1999,36).
Blackstone summarizes his "golden-rule" Christian natural law system by explaining
that it is the "excellent rule of gospel-morality, of 'doing to others, as we would they
should do unto ourselves'" (White & Patterson J999, 36). His theory provides a
foundation for law in the Christian religion and also a practical method for interpreting
and making laws, by referring to the intentions of the legislators. His theory of Christian
natural law differs from Greco-Roman natural law, in that Blackstone's uses as a
foundation the Christian religion and the Judeo-Christian Scriptures. This theory of
Christian natural law was deeply influential on the American Founders.
The influence of Blackstone and of Christian natural law upon the American
Founding Fathers was statistically quantified in an important study conducted by Dr.
Donald Lutz from the University of Houston. In the most comprehensive study of its
kind, Lutz reviewed 15,000 published political writings (speeches, articles, pamphlets,
etc.) from the Founding Era of the American Republic (defined as 1760-1805) and then
analyzed the cited sources for each statement in the writings. The purpose of the study
was to document and quantify the relative influence of different European writers on

71

Taylor - Separation
American political thought by tracing how many statements printed during the founding
era were based upon their writings. After ten years of research Lutz concluded his study
with two unexpected results.
First, the study showed that the Bible was actually the most cited source by far in
Founding Era political writings.
Second, Blackstone was the second most cited
individual thinker during the entire Founding Era, and he was by far the most cited
thinker during the time the Constitution was actually being written, ratified, and
implemented. Both of these findings give support to the assertion that the Christian
natural law championed by Blackstone and others had significant influence upon the
Founding Fathers and upon the foundations of American Jurisprudence.
Lutz's careful review of thousands of documents showed that the Bible alone
accounted for an astounding 34 percent of citations from Founding Era writings (Lutz
1984, 192). Lutz characterized this finding as "somewhat surprising," (Lutz 1984, 192)
and explained that it was important, "to note the prominence of biblical sources for
American political thought, since [the Bible] was highly influential in our political
tradition" (Lutz 1984. 192). Table I is a reproduction from Lutz's study showing the
relative number of citations attributed to thinkers of various political categories. The
table shows the absolute dominance of Biblical citations vis-a-vis citations from any
other source or category.

Table 1 - Distribution of Citations by Decade
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Besides finding that the Bible was actually the most often cited source in Founding
Era writings, Lutz also found Blackstone was the second most cited individual author
overall, and the most cited author during the Constitutional Era. While thinkers such as
Locke and Montesquieu were more often cited during the Revolutionary period,
Blackstone is by far the most prominently cited thinker during the Constitutional period
(1790-1805) when the actual details of the new Constitution, government, and courts
were being worked out. Table 2 is a reproduction from Lutz's study and illustrates
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Blackstone's dominance in this later period of the Founding Era, as indicated by the fact
that he is cited more than twice as often as any other individual thinker during that
period.
Table 2 - Most Cited Individual Thinker by Decade
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William Blackstone and his theory of Christian natural law were a dominant influence
upon the Founders. Boorstin stated, "In the history of American institutions, no other
book--except the Bible-has played so great a role as Blackstone's Commentaries of the
Laws of England." (Boorstin 1958, iii). The popularity of Blackstone in early American
Jurisprudence and political writings support this paper's claim that his Christian natural
law system deeply influenced the Founders.
This influence of Christian natural law upon federal and state governments is
witnessed by the dominance of Biblical and Blackstone citations in Founding Era
political writings. It is also clearly evident in numerous court cases involving the actual
implementation and administration of the law. The following are a few of many cases
which could be cited as examples. I
PEOPLE V. RUGGLES, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK,

1811

In this case the defendant was charged with blasphemy "of and concerning the
Christian religion, and of and concerning Jesus Christ" (Ruggles 1811, I), for having
spoken of Jesus Christ profanely. He was found guilty by the trial court and sentenced to
three months in prison and ordered to pay a fine of $500. The Supreme Court of New
York heard the case on appeal. The defendant's lawyer argued that given the lack of an
established church in the United States and in New York, "it was to be inferred that
Christianity did not make a part of the common law of this State" (Ruggles 1811, 2).
Hence, a man should be allowed "to declare his opinions" (Ruggles 1811, 2) about
I

For list of other cases which could be cited as examples see footnote #6 on p. 23.
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Christianity, even if some would consider the opinions to be blasphemous. Furthermore,
the defendant argued, America freely allowed the worship of Judaism and Islam. and
hence Christianity should not be entitled to any special privilege under the law.
Chief Justice James Kent 2 delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. Citing
Blackstone he rejected the defendant's arguments, and ruled that such blasphemous
words uttered "with a wicked and malicious disposition" did indeed constitute, "an
offense at common law" (Ruggles 1811, 6). The Court noted that previous courts had
held that "Christianity was parcel of the law" and to allow the brazen ridicule of
Christianity would be unwise, for "whatever strikes at the root of Christianity tends
manifestly to the dissolution of civil government" (Ruggles 1811,6)..
Because of the blending of Christian natural law and US law it was commonly held
that Christianity was part of the law, and that to allow an attack upon Christianity was
tantamount to allowing an attack upon the law. This, of course, would lead to the
"dissolution" of civil government, as respect for the law was broken down. The
jurisprudential influence of Christian natural law was clearly evident here, as the Court
noted, "The very idea of jurisprudence . . . embraced the religion of the country"
(Ruggles 1811, 8).
In addition to ruling that Christianity was part of the common law, the Court also
declared that non-Christian religions were not entitled to the same protections:
Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the constitution, as some have
strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the
like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet [Mohamed] or of the Grand Lama;
and for this plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian people,
and the morality of the country is deeply in grafted [sic] upon Christianity, and
not upon the doctrines or worship of those imposters. (Ruggles 1811,8-9).
According to the Court, the US and New York Constitutions protected Christianity
because the country was built upon Christianity and not upon other religious "imposters."
While such a statement would shock most modern Americans, it clearly demonstrates the
influence of Christian natural law in early American jurisprudence and substantiates the
claim that the Founders created no wall of separation between church and state. Early
courts held that Christianity was actually part of the law and was entitled to protection as
such, because it was the very basis for the law.
UPDEGRAPH I: COMMONWEALTH, SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA,

1834

Updegraph was also a case of blasphemy; the defendant was charged with
blasphemy against "the Christian Religion and the Scriptures of Truth" for having,
"unlawfully, wickedly, and premeditatedly, despitefully and blasphemously" said "that
the Holy Scriptures were a mere fable" (Updegraph 1824, 1). The trial court found the
defendant guilty and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard the case on appeal.
2 Kent is sometimes referred to as one of the "Fathers of American Jurisprudence. He
published the well known and well respected four volume Commentaries 011 American
Law.
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The defendant argued that the Constitution of the United States forbade the
establishment of religion, and did not protect Christianity from persons merely speaking
their opinions "in a discussion" (Updegraph 1824, 3). In rejecting the defendant's
assertions. the unanimous Court noted that the defendant, like defendants in similar cases,
made the misguided assertion "that Christianity never was received as part of the
common law of this Christian land; [or] that if it was, it was virtually repealed by the
constitution of the United States" (Updegraph 1824, 13). The Court explained that this
bold line of thinking (i.e., that Christianity was not part of the law) "has often been
explored," but "it is a barren soil, upon which no flower ever blossomed" (Updegraph
1824). The Court declared, "The plaintiff in error has totally failed to support his grand
objection to this indictment, for Christianity is part of the common law" (Updegraph
1824, 36). In fact, the court countered, "Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always
has been, a part of the common law of Pennsylvania" (Updegraph 1824, 14-15).
The Court was careful to note that everyone was entitled to believe in whatever
religion they desired; in fact, the Court noted that the state of Pennsylvania was
remarkably tolerant in religious matters "with the exception of disqualification for office
of all who did not profess faith in Jesus Christ" (Updegraph 1824, 24l The Court also
provided a detailed history and description of the role and importance of Christianity in
the law. In this decision almost fifty years after the ratification of the US Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, a unanimous Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that Christianity
was part of the law, even the very basis for the law, and that as such it was afforded
special protection from blasphemy.
This historical analysis of Christianity's role is particularly important for the
purposes of this paper, which seeks to demonstrate that Christian natural law was once
the standard of adjudication, not the 'wall of separation.' Speaking again of religious
toleration, the Court explained, "No preference is given by law to any particular religious
persuasion.
Protection is given to all by our laws" (Updegraph 1824, 36).
Notwithstanding this toleration, the Court declares, "It is only the malicious reviler of
Christianity who is punished" (Updegraph 1824, 36). Again the court underscores the
relation between Christianity and the law, thus requiring the special protection under the
law of Christianity.
To the modem American, this ruling that only blasphemy of the Christian religion
was prohibited may seem patently unfair. However, the Court explained why:
No society can tolerate a willful and despiteful attempt to subvert its religion ...
a general, malicious, and deliberate intent to overthrow Christianity, general
Christianity. This is the line of indication, where crime commences, and the
offence becomes the subject of penal visitation. (Updegraph 1824, 3 I).
The Court declared that an attack upon America's religion was in essence an attack
upon its laws, and said that no society could be expected tolerate such an act. A citizen
3 Laws requiring a belief in Christianity or a Supreme Being and an after-life to hold
office were commonplace in many other states also even long after the passage of the US
Constitution and of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment which supposedly
created the 'wall of separation.'
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was allowed to believe whatever religion he/she saw fit to believe in; the belief crossed
the "line of indication" and became criminal, however, if the citizen blasphemed
Christianity, which the Court declared was "certainly the religion of the country" and
"part of the common law of this state" (Updegraph 1824, 32-33). It is interesting to note
that the court spoke of "general" Christianity, as the Court was not choosing any specific
denomination within Christianity to be favored. This allowance of "general" Christianity
into the application of law was the original interpretation of the Church/state relationship
in American Jurisprudence. The Founders intended that Americans would be free to
practice the religion of their choice, but that general, non-denominational Christian
principles were expected and understood to be the foundation for the law.
The Court continued by explaining that Christianity was fundamentally necessary for
the rule of law in America: "It is impossible to administer the laws without taking the
religion which the defendant in error has scoffed at, that Scripture which he had reviled,
as their basis" (Updegraph 1824,33). The Court clearly declared that Christianity and
the Holy Scriptures were the basis for the laws; in fact, the Court ruled, "the great body
of the laws [is] an incorporation of the common law doctrine of Christianity" (Updegraph
1824, 24). Here the Court clearly delineates the blending of Christianity and the lawwhich is the basis for the Christian natural law this paper seeks to prove was a foundation
in early American Jurisprudence.
The Court also declared that "religion and morality" were the "foundations of all
governments" (Updegraph 1824, 33) and explained that "Without these restraints no free
government could long exist" (Updegraph 1824, 33). The Court revealed strong
Christian natural law leanings, because it held that the nation's laws were indeed founded
upon and even dependant upon Christianity. The Founders and the early jurists who
interpreted their laws believed that the rule of law depended upon each citizen's ability to
lead a moral life and obey the laws. As Christianity was the almost universal religion of
the country and believed to be part of the law of the land, it was natural to assume that
this type of moral life could best be brought about by adherence to Christian principles.
This assumption was the fulfillment of Blackstone's vision of the Divine Law and
Natural Law operating together for a happy society. Americans overwhelmingly believed
Christianity and the Bible to be the source of the Divine Law; thus, the Court held that to
allow open blasphemy against Christianity would "weaken the bonds by which society is
held together" (Updegraph 1824, 38). This case, adjudicated nearly fifty years after the
passage of the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights clearly shows the dominance of
Christian natural law thinking in pre-Everson American Jurisprudence.
COMMONWEALTH V. KNEELAND, SUPREME COURT or MASSACHUSETTS,

1838

Kneeland is another blasphemy case and will only be treated briefly to show that the
enforcement of the blasphemy laws occurred in many states and also to show that the
press was not exempted from these laws. In this case the defendant, Kneeland, was
charged with blasphemy, for, "reproaching Jesus Christ and the Holy Ghost," because he
published that the "whole story" concerning Jesus Christ was "a fable and a fiction"
(Kneeland 1838, 1-2). On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, he asserted the
familiar argument that the law against blasphemy was invalid, because of a supposed
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separation of church and state. He also claimed "that the liberty of the press" allowed a
person to publish "whatever he pleases, from bad or good motives" (Kneeland 1838,48).
Like other coutis who heard similar arguments, the Court summarily rejected
Kneeland's assertions and upheld his sentence of "sixty days' imprisonment" (Kneeland
1838, 77). The Court quoted from Blackstone to demonstrate the importance of
blasphemy laws and used reasoning similar to the previous cases. However, the Court
also noted that such laws had been "repeatedly enforced" and that "many prosecutions
and convictions" resulted (Kneeland 1838, 21). According to the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts blasphemy of God or of Christianity was taken very seriously and the laws
were regularly enforced; this case shows that nearly fifty years after the passage of the
Bill of Rights a person could still be sentenced to sixty days in jail for blasphemy against
Jesus Christ because Christianity was tied so closely to the law.
SHorER , .. STATE, SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS,

1850

George Shover was charged with "Sabbath-breaking" for having "unlawfully kep[t]
open his grocery" on a Sunday (Shover 1850, I). Sunday laws or "blue laws" were once
very common throughout the United States. Shover was convicted by the trial court and
sentenced. He appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court asserting that "the
act upon which the indictment was based was unconstitutional" (2) because it violated the
separation of church and state found in Arkansas' Declaration of Rights.
The Court summarily rejected Shover's assertion and Chief Justice Johnson declared
in a unanimous opinion that Sunday and Christianity were protected by law:
Sunday or the Sabbath is properly and emphatically called the Lord's day, and is
one amongst the first and most sacred institutions of the Christian religion. This
system of religion is recognized as constituting a part and parcel of the common
law, and as such all of the institutions growing out of it, or, in any way
connected to with it . . . are entitled to the most profound respect, and can
rightfully claim the protection of the law making power of the State. (Shover
1850, 6; emphasis added).
Christianity was again ruled by another unanimous State Supreme Court to be part of
the law, and hence entitled to state protection. The Court also explained why the action
of Sabbath-breaking was criminalized:
The act of keeping open a grocery on Sunday is not, in itself, innocent or even
indifferent, but it is, on the contrary, highly vicious and demoralizing in its
tendency, as it amounts to a general invitation to the community to enter and
indulge in the intoxicating cup, thereby shocking their sense of propriety and
common decency, and bringing into utter contempt the sacred and venerable
institution of the Sabbath. It is not simply the act of keeping open a grocery, but
the keeping of it open on Sunday, that forms ... the offence. (Shover 1850,
264).
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Although the state allowed the freedom of worship, the enforcement of Sunday laws
was considered completely constitutional. The Court ruled that allowing a grocery to
remain open would have a "deleterious effects upon the body politic," (Shover 1850,
263) because the morals of the community would be assaulted. The Christian natural law
position of allowing the government to enforce Christian morals-even upon the
unwilling or non-believing-is clearly evident here. Also apparent is the Christian
natural law blending of natural and divine law (i.e., the Sacred Sabbath), into human law
(i.e., Sabbath laws/blue laws). The Court ruled nearly sixty years after the passage of the
Bill of Rights that the binding together of Christianity and the law allowed for the
protection of the Sabbath.
TlIURS70N 1'. WHITNEY, SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS,

1848.

In a previous trial Thurston had been convicted based on the testimony of an
acknowledged atheist. He appealed to the Supreme Court alleging that the testimony of
an atheist was not admissible in court and a unanimous Court ruled in Thurston's favor.
After citing numerous precedents, the Court declared, "all authorities agree, that an
atheist, who disbelieves in the existence of a God, who is 'the rewarder of truth and
avenger of falsehood,' cannot be permitted to testifY' (Thurston 1848, 11-12). It was
held that an atheist did not believe that, "perjury will surely be punished by some
supreme power;" (Thurston 1848, 7) and hence, an oath would be, "ineffectual to bind his
conscience to speak the truth" (Thurston 1848, 6). The testimony of an atheist was
inadmissible, because the Court stated that he did not believe that he would be held
accountable before God for his testimony. The Court closed with these powerful words,
"We are therefore very clearly of the opinion, that the [atheist] witness was incompetent,
and ought not to have been allowed to testify" (Thurston 1848, 13; emphasis added).
Here again a unanimous state Supreme Court rules based on the blending of Christianity
and the law.
UNITED STATES V. MILLER, U.S. DISTRICT COURT (WASHINGTON, D.C.),

1916

This case also involved a witness who did not believe in a "God who rewards truth
and avenges falsehood" (Miller 1916, I). The witness' testimony was challenged, and
the US Court sustained the challenge. The Court ruled, "Under the common-law rule a
person who does not believe in a God who is the rewarder of truth and the avenger of
falsehood cannot be permitted to testify" (Miller 1916, 1-2). Importantly, the Court also
officially recognized the sources of the common-law: "The common law consists of those
principles, maxims, usages, and rules founded on reason, natural justice, and an
enlightened public policy" (Miller 1916,4). Here the court recognized both reason and
"natural justice" as contributors to common-law-both are foundational principles in
Christian natural law. Additionally, the Court ruled more than one hundred years after
the passage of the Bill of Rights that the testimony of an atheist could be challenged
because the atheist did not believe in God.
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WILKERSOA l' ROME, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA,

1922

This case involved a lawsuit challenging the City of Rome's law requiring the daily
reading of the King James Bible in every public school. The law required:
Some portion of the King James Version of the Bible, of either the Old or New
Testaments, to be read and prayer offered to God in the hearing of the Pupils of
the Public Schools of the City of Rome daily. (Wilkerson 1922, I).
The reading and prayer were to be done, "without comment," (Wilkerson 1922, 2)
and an, "exemption from attendance" (2) would be granted to any student upon parental
request.
A suit was filed, alleging that the law violated the separation of church and state and
that, "readings and offering of prayers. .. is prohibited by the law in public schools"
(Ibid., 4), It was also argued that the law would "aid the Protestant sect of the Christian
Church" while undermining the, "Roman Catholic" or "Jewish faith" (Wilkerson 1922,
5),

The Georgia Supreme Court heard the case on appeal and summarily rejected the
plaintiffs arguments and ruled that the reading and prayer, "offered in the hearing of the
pupils daily during the regular session of school, is not in conflict with [the religious
freedom] paragraphs of the constitution of Georgia" (Wilkerson 1922,7). The Court first
cited other states and cities with similar Bible reading laws. Then Justice Hines, writing
for the 5-2 majority, made an important distinction between providing religious freedom
to all while still maintaining Christianity as part of the law.
The Court explained that the passages of the Georgia Constitution guaranteeing
religious freedom for all people were created so that "all might enjoy an unrestricted
liberty in their religion" (Wilkerson 1922, 16). However, the passages were not to be
construed so as to allow a "war upon the Bible and its use in common [public] schools"
(Wilkerson 1922, 15). In fact, the Court noted, "Those who drafted and adopted our
constitution could never have intended it [the Georgia Religious Freedom Act] to meet
such narrow and sectarian views" (Wilkerson 1922, 15). The Court summarized the
movement for the separation of church and state in these terms:
[T]his was not a movement for the separation of the State from Christianity, but
specifically a separation of Church and State. Christianity entered into the
whole warp and woof of our governmental fabric. (Wilkerson 1922, 16).
The Court also quotes from Daniel Webster's famous church and state speech to
support their claim that the separation of church and states does not mean that
Christianity and the state are separated:
All, all proclaim that Christianity, general, tolerant Christianity, Christianity
independent of sects and parties, that Christianity to which the sword and fagot
are unknown, general, tolerant Christianity, is the law of the land. (Wilkerson
1922, 15-16).
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Like other cOUl1s faced with a religious freedom claim, this Court again declared that
notwithstanding religious freedom acts, Christianity was indeed part of the law of the
land-the Christian natural law blending of human and divine law is again evident. No
one specific Christian denomination was to be favored, but no wall between Christianity
and the state was ever erected.
Following Blackstone's principles of judicial interpretation, the Court repeatedly
sought to discover and explain the motives of the founders, writing, "From an
examination of all of them [religious freedom laws] and of their origin, we think it clearly
appears that the framers of our constitutions have never intended to declare the policy of
this State to be unreligious or unchristian" (Wilkerson 1922, 24). The court ruled that
Christianity was to be a part of the policy of the state, and as such, state activities could
be Christian in nature.
To support their claim that the founders never intended to separate Christianity from
the State, the Court cited numerous legal precedents (including some that this paper has
treated) in order to clearly establish that the founders and early justices clearly
understood that the principle of religious freedom and the conception of general
Christianity as part of the law of the land could operate in harmony. This idea was a
major tenant of the Christian natural law endorsed by the founders. No particular
religious belief or sect was to be forced on anyone; however, it was clearly understood
that Christianity was the foundation for human law. The use of this Christian natural law
approach as a guide in adjudication was commonplace and constitutional in America for
many years after the passage of the Bill of Rights. The 1947 US Supreme Court ruling in
Everson, however, radically altered the judicial paradigm.

Everson v. Board of Education, US Supreme Court, 1947
The shift from Christian natural law as a basis for American Jurisprudence to the
contemporary jurisprudential paradigm of 'wall of separation' occurred most
dramatically in Everson. In this case a divided US Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision
that, "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must
be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach" (Everson
1947, 18). The separation language of Everson contrasts sharply with the Christian
natural law language of earlier court decisions as cited above. This ruling introduced a
new paradigm, because the 'wall of separation' metaphor quickly became popular with
separation proponents. While Everson signaled the major paradigm shift, in some senses
the shift had been occurring gradually for decades.
As the nation became more pluralistic, religiously-based laws were inevitably
relaxed. For example, state laws requiring a belief in Christianity to hold office
(commonplace at the Founding) had all been eliminated or replaced with laws requiring
the belief in a Supreme Being4. However, the basic belief that America was a Christian

Even these non-denominational laws were invalidated, however, in 1961 by the US
Supreme Court; see Torcaso v. Watkins. The Court used Everson's "separation"
language to support the invalidation.

4
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nation and that America's laws are based upon Christianity was upheld by the US
Supreme Court as recently as 1892 and 1931 5 .
The Court in Everson, however, rapidly accelerated the change that had been
gradually occurring, and public religion and public Christianity are now favorite targets
for atheists, the ACLU, and other interest groups. For example, long-time nativity or
creche scenes, once constitutional and popular in almost every community, have been
outlawed, or made to become non-religious in nature. Crosses have been driven from
war memorials. displays of the Ten Commandments have been moved, and actions once
considered crimes against natural law or Christianity (blasphemy, sodomy, birth control
etc.) have been decriminalized 6 . Clearly. the shift has been away from the Christian
natural law blending of the human and the divine, and towards a separation of church and
state. or a separation of the human from the divine.
Significant disagreement exists over the 'wall of separation' between church and
state. which according to Everson was created by the First Amendment. For example, the
late Chief Justice William Rehnquist has ridiculed the 'wall of separation' phrase, calling
it a "misleading metaphor" (Wallace 1985,93). This phrase is attributed to a letter by
Thomas Jefferson and. ironically. was first used judicially to support the enforcement of
Christian community standards against polygam/, not to support a separation of church
and state. Also ironically. Reynolds was the only judicial precedent cited by the Court in
Everson to support its 'wall of separation' claim--even though the Court in Reynolds
denied the separation of church and state claimed by the Mormon plaintiff as the Court
enforced Christian standards against polygamy.
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist also explained that using Jefferson's 'wall of
separation' metaphor is irrelevant because he was in France when the Constitution and
Bill of Rights were written:
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment
Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for
nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the
constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by
Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association [that included the 'wall of separation phrase'] was a short note of
courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He
would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of

5 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States (1892), and Macintosh v. United States
(1931)
6 Blasphemy laws were invalidated in 1970, see Mmyland v. West; sodomy laws were
invalidated in 2003, see Lawrence v. Texas; Birth-control laws were invalidated in 1963,
see Grizwald v. Connecticut.
7 See Reynolds v. United States (1897). In this case a Mormon plaintiff argued that he
should be allowed to practice polygamy because the US separated church and state. The
COUlt rejected his arguments and declared that the state had the right to enforce Christian
standards even against non-believing persons.
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contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. (Wallace 1985,92).
Blackstone's system of Christian natural law-the basis for the American
jurisprudential system-calls for judges to examine the motives and objectives of the
framers of a law in order to understand the true intent of a law. Using this standard,
Thomas Jefferson is clearly not the person to consult concerning the intentions of the
First Amendment as he was not even present in the US when the Amendment was
written. Notwithstanding this obvious conclusion, the courts have completely ignored the
objections stated above by the late Chief Justice and have used Jefferson's phrase 8 as if it
were part of the Bill of Rights or of the Constitution itself. In fact, Justice Gallagher
from the New York State Supreme Court stated-almost prophetically-in 1958:
Much has been written in recent years ... to 'a wall of separation between
church and State' ... [It] has received so much attention that one would almost
think at times that it is to be found somewhere in our Constitution. (Baer 1958,
237).
Ironically, Justice Gallagher's statement neaTly fifty years ago is fulfilled; many
Americans do believe that the phrase "separation of church and state" is actually found in
the US Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. This, however, is completely incorrect, as
the only mention of religion is found in the First Amendment which simply states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof' (U.S. Constitution, Amendment I).
In addition to not being found in the Constitution or Bill of Rights, the over reliance
on the 'wall of separation' metaphor ignores the intentions of the Founders who drafted
the Amendment. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist offered this scathing analysis of the
"wall" metaphor and its impact on jurisprudence:
But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous diversion of judges
from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The "crucible of
litigation," is well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on the basis of
testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of historical errors in
judicial opinions can make the errors true. The "wall of separation between
church and State" is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has
proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly
abandoned. (Wallace 1985, 107).
Rehnquist asserts that the metaphor is undermining the concept of judicial reviewthe idea that the intentions of a law's founders must be examined. The courts constantly
cite as precedent a single phrase, from a single letter written by Thomas Jefferson, instead
of examining what the actual authors of the Amendment said. As quoted above,
Rehnquist explains that Jefferson was not even a participant in creating the Bill of Rights,
There are also valid arguments-outside the scope ofthis paper-that conclude
Jefferson's statement is taken out of context.

8
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and his comments fourteen years after the fact are certainly not the best source to
discover the First Amendment authors' intentions. Instead of examining previous court
cases for illumination, the Supreme Court uses Jefferson's metaphor-which Rehnquist
calls a "misleading metaphor-" as precedent to separate Christianity from the state.
Rehnquist also notes that the Court is relying on historical and factual errors and that
hence the entire 'wall of separation' paradigm is invalid and should be abandoned.
The late Chief Justice's analysis of the 'wall of separation' is both legally convincing
and exhaustively documented. As demonstrated in this paper, the notion that the
Founders intended to create a 'wall' between church and state is patently ridiculous. If
they did, early American judges certainly did not understand this, because the judges
constantly ruled in favor of the blending of divine and human law. Christian natural law
was deeply influential in America's Founding and in pre-Everson adjudication. Multiple
rulings-almost all unanimous-by state supreme courts cited in this paper have
9
demonstrated these facts, and numerous other cases could also be cited.
Certainly, Christian natural law has shortcomings.
For example, with an
increasingly pluralistic society it is difficult to agree on moral truths. Also, certain
religions might find their beliefs trampled by the majority's morals; for example, the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and polygamy in the late 1800's.
However, these difficulties do not signify that the US needs to continue to abandon
all laws based on Christian natural law, as some seem to think necessary. The application
of general Christian principles and morals can be successfully accomplished without loss
of individual rights. All religions can be respected, while still allowing general Christian
principles to have a prominent role in American public life. The Founders and early
justices clearly agreed. America's Founders and pre-Everson jurists regularly drew on
Christian natural law principles to blend human law with general Christian principles.
Prior to Everson the highest courts in the land regularly declared this to be a
Christian nation, and regularly declared the laws to be based upon and even dependent
upon Christianity. Surely the Everson 'wall of separation' interpretation of the First
Amendment is a far cry from the Christian natural law foundation the Founding Fathers
laid and pre-Everson jurists protected. The author joins with the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist in asserting that the Everson interpretation defies 150 years of previous
American jurisprudence, and should be reexamined and abandoned for a return to
Christian natural law in jurisprudence and for a return of general Christian principles to
American public life.
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